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Abstract
This paper examines the eects of dierent corporate governance mechanisms
on the cost of debt for large European rms and documents a novel interaction
eect between shareholder rights and disclosure. Improved disclosure leads to
a lower credit spread only if shareholder rights are low. A possible explanation
for this nding is the `share rights or disclose' hypothesis. If shareholders
have sucient rights to monitor and inuence management decisions, debt
providers can rely upon shareholders to mitigate agency costs. Otherwise,
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1 Introduction
The separation of ownership and control in modern rms leads to possible agency
costs due to conicts of interest between management and the providers of capital
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The presence of good
corporate governance mechanisms at the rm level can help to reduce these agency
risks. This holds in particular for shareholder rights, which enable providers of equity
capital to exercise sucient control in order to prevent that the rm's management
pursues its own interests. Similarly, transparency may help to alleviate the tension
between management and investors. An important reason for the occurrence of
agency problems between management and investors is information asymmetry. In
particular, (potential) capital providers may require a premium on equity and bonds
to compensate for the fact that it is dicult (or even impossible) to assess the true
value of the rm based on the information made available by the rm's management.
Improved disclosure obviously can reduce this information risk (Sengupta, 1998 and
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006).
A substantial body of empirical literature indeed conrms that both the cost of
equity and the cost of debt can be aected by the quality of various governance
mechanisms, including not only shareholder rights and disclosure but also the com-
position of the board and takeover defences. While most studies consider dierent
governance components in isolation, it is quite possible that interaction eects oc-
cur. For example, Cremers et al. (2007) document that shareholder control (proxied
by large institutional blockholders) is associated with lower (higher) bond yields if
the rm is protected from (exposed to) takeovers. Cremers and Nair (2005) nd a
similar complimentary eect of these shareholder governance mechanisms on equity
returns. Cheng et al. (2006) nd that a lower cost of equity is achieved only when
both shareholder rights and nancial transparency or disclosure are high. This is
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explained by the reasoning that improved possibilities for shareholders to monitor
and discipline the rm's management give managers incentives to disclose informa-
tion more timely and accurately. Conversely, a higher level of disclosure enhances
the ability of shareholders to eectively monitor the rm's management.
In this paper, we conduct a detailed empirical analysis of the relation between
the quality of dierent components of corporate governance and the cost of debt. We
distinguish between four governance mechanisms, namely (i) shareholder rights, (ii)
takeover defences, (iii) board structure and functioning and (iv) disclosure. While we
also examine the eects of these components in isolation, we focus on the possibility
of interaction eects between the dierent governance mechanisms on the cost of
debt.
The dataset consists of 542 new bond issues by large European rms during the
period 2001-2009. The cost of debt is measured by the yield spread of these issues.
The quality of corporate governance is measured by means of corporate governance
ratings constructed by Deminor.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. We nd a strong interaction
eect between the quality of disclosure and shareholder rights. Firms' cost of debt
is negatively associated with the quality of disclosure but only if shareholder rights
fall below a certain level. At the same time, the cost of debt is always reduced
by an increase in shareholder rights, independent of its level and independent of
the quality of disclosure. The eects of disclosure on the cost of debt are not only
statistically but also economically signicant. We nd that the credit spread for
rms with shareholder rights lower than 6 (on a scale from 0-10) decreases with
more than 40 basis points if we move from the lower quartile to the upper quartile
of disclosure.
The negative interaction eect between disclosure and shareholder rights that
we nd contradicts the complimentary eect for the cost of equity as documented
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by Cheng et al.. (2006). A possible explanation for our nding is that for the cost
of debt, these governance mechanisms act more like substitutes. More precisely, we
formulate the hypothesis that the eect of disclosure on the cost of debt crucially
depends on the level of shareholder rights. This `share rights or disclose' hypothesis
states that a high level of disclosure only has a benecial eect on the cost of debt
if shareholder rights are low. If shareholder rights are high and thus agency costs
between capital providers and management are low, the economic relevance of in-
formation risk for debt holders is low as well. If management misallocates capital,
shareholders will - sooner or later - intervene and enforce corrective action in case
they have sucient possibilities to do so. However, if shareholder rights are low, debt
providers must be able to estimate the healthiness of the rm properly themselves,
requiring a sucient level of disclosure. The less rights shareholders have to mon-
itor and discipline management, the more important disclosure is for the providers
of debt. Put dierently, the rm's management should `share rights or disclose.'
Bradley and Chen (2010) suggest that the eect of shareholder rights on the cost
of debt depends on a rm's creditworthiness since the interests of shareholders and
bondholders are more aligned if credit quality is high. When a rm is nancially
distressed, however, stronger power of shareholders would exacerbate the conict
with bondholders, and may therefore even be associated with a higher cost of debt.
Our results show that not only the eects of shareholder rights and disclosure on the
cost of debt but also their interaction eects are stronger for bonds issued by rms
with higher credit quality. This conrms the idea that agency problems between
dierent categories of capital providers are low if the rm's creditworthiness is high.
A further empirical nding that is of interest is that the substitution eect be-
tween shareholder rights and disclosure is relevant only for short-term debt, with
maturities less than approximately seven years. This is consistent with the struc-
tural credit risk model of Due and Lando (2001), in which uncertainty about the
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true rm value has a notable eect on credit spreads at short maturities, but is
irrelevant at long maturities. Correspondingly, Yu (2005) nds that the quality of
disclosure is an eective mechanism to reduce this `transparency spread' for short-
term bonds, while disclosure has no eect for long-term debt. We document that
this maturity eect continues to apply when we allow for the interaction of disclosure
with shareholder rights.
Finally, in the empirical analysis we nd no relation between takeover defences
or the board structure and the cost of debt. Hence, the quality of these governance
mechanisms does not seem relevant for debt providers. We also do not nd evidence
for the presence of any other interaction eects between dierent governance compo-
nents, apart from the substitution eect between shareholder rights and disclosure.
Previous literature on the eects of corporate governance on the cost of debt
(which is discussed in more detail in Section 3) includes Sengupta (1998), Bho-
jraj and Sengupta (2003), Anderson et al. (2004), Klock et al. (2005), Yu (2005),
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), and Cremers et al. (2007). Most of these studies only
consider the eects of a specic aspect of corporate governance, such as shareholder
rights or board structure. In this paper we make two contributions to the literature.
First, our governance measures concern four dierent components of corporate gov-
ernance constructed by a single independent source. The availability of four dierent
measures makes it possible to determine the relevance of each component as well as
their interaction for the cost of debt, which makes our analysis more comprehensive
than studies that take one aspect into account only. Second, we introduce the `share
rights or disclose' hypothesis as a possible explanation for the interaction eect we
reveal between the quality of disclosure and shareholder rights.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the Deminor
governance data. We discuss related prior empirical research on the eects of corpo-
rate governance on the cost of debt in Section 3. Section 4 describes our econometric
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methodology based on linear and threshold regression models, as well as our data
set of bond issues by large European rms during the period 2001-2009. We present
the main empirical results in Section 5 and conduct further analysis and robustness
checks in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Governance data
We measure the quality of dierent dimensions of rm-level corporate governance by
means of Deminor ratings. These ratings cover rms included in the FTSEurorst
300 Index for the years 2000-2008. The Deminor ratings are based on 300 dierent
governance indicators that refer to internationally accepted standards, as outlined
by the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), the World Bank, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Con-
ference Board (Deminor Rating, 2004).1;2 The dierent indicators or criteria can be
classied into four categories: (i) rights and duties of shareholders (referred to as
Shareholder rights in the remainder of the paper); (ii) range of takeover defences
(Takeover defences); (iii) board structure and functioning (Board); and (iv) disclo-
sure on nancial matters and corporate governance (Disclosure). For each category
a rating is available on a scale from 0 to 10, where a score of 10 (0) corresponds to
the best (worst) possible governance quality. The total governance score is simply
the sum of the rating scores for the four categories.
The rst category of governance criteria, Shareholder rights, concerns the ques-
tion whether shareholders can exert sucient power to determine corporate action
1The Deminor rating methodology further takes into consideration the main orientations chosen
by national Codes of Best Practice, among which: the Combined Code in the UK (2003); the Vienot
reports and the Bouton report in France (1995, 1999 and 2002); the Kodex in Germany (2002);
the Preda Code in Italy (1999); and the Tabaksblat Code in The Netherlands (2003).
2About the same criteria are used by Standard & Poor's for their corporate governance score
(Standard & Poor's, 2002). This, taken together with the fact that all of these institutions have
more or less the same ideas concerning good corporate governance, leads us to conclude that the
Deminor rating is a representative measure for the quality of a rm's corporate governance.
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and to steer management in the right direction and away from decisions that harm
shareholder value. The score is based on a) the `one share - one vote - one dividend'
principle; b) access to and voting procedures at general meetings; and c) mainte-
nance of pre-emptive rights. Firms that respect the shareholders' roles of control
and ownership score high on the `one share - one vote - one dividend' principle.
Deminor evaluates whether companies submit voting issues that are perceived as
particularly signicant to the general meeting of shareholders and assesses the vot-
ing structure. Furthermore, companies should respect the pre-emptive rights of the
existing shareholders as these stakeholders would like to prevent dilution of their
voting or economic power.
The second category, Takeover defences, examines the extent to which the rm
attempts to limit the possibility of a hostile takeover through the adoption of anti-
takeover provisions. Deminor examines the presence and strength of anti-takeover
devices such as poison pills, golden parachutes, core shareholdings and extensive
cross-shareholdings. To achieve a high score for this aspect of governance, the range
of takeover defences should lead to a favourable bidding process and not preclude
the success of a takeover attempt per se. For the purpose of our analysis it is useful
to note that the presence of major (institutional) shareholders is also considered to
oer protection against hostile takeovers and as such it aects the Takeover defences
score negatively.
The third category, Board, measures issues relating to the structure and func-
tioning of the Board, such as the presence of independent directors, the division
between the role of Chairman and Chief Executive and the election of the board.
The fourth category, Disclosure, measures whether shareholders and bondholders
are able to obtain convenient and comprehensive information about the company's
nancial matters as well as its governance characteristics. Deminor analyses for
instance the quantity and quality of non-nancial information, such as the diversity
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and independence of board members, board committees, accounting standards and
information on major shareholders of the company.
We obtain Deminor ratings for all rms that were included in the FTSEurorst
300 Index at some point during the period 2000-2008. In our empirical analysis,
we only include year t ratings (which are published at the beginning of year t + 1)
for a particular rm in case a new bond was issued in year t + 1. Furthermore, we
exclude nancial rms (Worldscope Industry Group code 4300) as their nancing
decisions are aected by dierent factors than those of industrial rms (Sengupta,
1998) and some accounting variables of nancial rms are dicult to compare to
those of non-nancial rms.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the governance scores for the resulting
sample, comprising 542 rm-year observations (from 186 unique rms).3 We observe
a positive trend in the overall score, as well as in the sub-scores for the dierent
corporate governance dimensions. The average total score in 2000 is equal to 19.36,
which gradually increases by about 45 percent to 28.19 in 2007. This upward trend is
in line with the increased attention paid to governance structures by policymakers,
see footnote 1 for a list of National Codes of Best Practice, and the subsequent
rm actions to improve their corporate governance. In 2008 a decrease of 8 percent
from 28.19 to 25.88 is observed, which is mostly caused by a substantial drop in
the average subscore for Takeover defences from 5.60 in 2007 to 3.90 in 2008. The
nancial crisis might have had an impact on the anti-takeover devices implemented
by rms. It is further interesting to note that the changes in average scores vary
considerably across the dierent governance components. Disclosure shows the most
pronounced increase by almost 56 percent from 5.20 to 8.09 between 2000 and 2008.
3For the complete set of all rms covered by Deminor, irrespective of whether they issued any
bonds during the sample period, we nd very similar patterns in the average governance scores
across years, countries and industries as those reported here for the sample that is used in our
subsequent analysis. Detailed statistics are available upon request.
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The governance mechanisms related to the board improve by about 45 percent, from
4.61 to 6.70, comparable to the increase in Takeover defences from 3.77 in 2000 to
5.60 in 2007 (prior to the decline to 3.90 in 2008). The increase in Shareholder rights
is much more modest at 24 percent from 5.78 to 7.19.4
- insert Table 1 about here -
Tables 2 and 3 present the governance scores by country and industry, respec-
tively. The extensive investor rights in common law countries such as the United
Kingdom and Ireland (LaPorta et al., 1998) are conrmed by the relatively high
governance scores for rms in these countries. At a level of almost 30, the average
scores for the United Kingdom and Ireland are more than 20 percent higher than
the average scores for the `next best' countries Sweden, France and Finland.5 The
average scores for the UK are higher than the overall European average for all four
categories, with the dierence being most pronounced for Takeover defences. In fact,
the only average scores comparable to the UK are those for Germany and Italy on
Shareholder rights and Disclosure, respectively.6
Across industries, we observe from Table 3 that Beverages, Metal producers,
Metal product Manufacturers, Recreation and Tobacco have relatively high total
governance scores. These relatively high scores are (at least partly) due to the
UK country eect given that 12 of the 18 Beverages observations, 12 of 12 Metal
producers observations, 4 of the 6 Metal product manufacturers observations, 8 of
the 9 Recreation observations and 14 of the 18 Tobacco observations concern UK
rms. If we control for country (and year eects), we nd only very little evidence
4To some extent this is of course due to the fact that the scores of Shareholder rights were at a
higher level at the start of our sample period in 2000.
5Note that the number of observations for Ireland is only four, so that the average governance
scores for this country have to be interpreted with caution.
6The relatively high Shareholder rights scores for Greece and Norway are based on only one and
seven observations respectively, hence we refrain from drawing strong conclusions from those.
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that average governance scores in particular industries dier signicantly from the
overall average.7
- insert Tables 2 and 3 about here -
3 Prior empirical research
Prior empirical research documents a link between the quality of dierent corporate
governance mechanisms and the cost of debt or the credit rating of the rm. Sen-
gupta (1998) shows a negative relation between the quality of a rm's disclosure and
its cost of debt.8 This nding would suggest that governance mechanisms can aect
bond yields indirectly through a reduction in `information risk'.9 The measure for
the quality of disclosure used by Sengupta (1998) is a rating of the rm by nancial
analysts (AIMR disclosure ratings), while the yield to maturity and the total inter-
est expenses on new bond issues are used to measure the cost of debt. Results show
that both measures are negatively related to the quality of disclosure, taking other
possible determinants of the cost of debt into account. Moreover, Sengupta (1998)
documents that disclosure is particularly important for the cost of debt for rms
with insecure future prospects, using the standard deviation of daily stock returns
as a measure of future insecurity.
7To control for country and year eects we regress the governance scores on country dummies
and year dummies and compute industry averages for the residuals.
8The relation between disclosure and the cost of equity is analyzed by e.g. Welker (1995),
Botosan (1997) and Cheng et al. (2006). Welker (1995) documents a negative association between
nancial analysts' disclosure measurement and the bid-ask spread set by market makers. Botosan
(1997) nds for the machinery industry a negative association between disclosure in annual reports
and rms' cost of equity, but only for rms with low analyst following. Cheng et al. (2006) nd
a negative relation between the cost of equity and nancial transparency as well as shareholder
rights. These relations are strengthened by a higher level of the other factor.
9Related empirical research on information risk is Mansi et al. (2011). They argue that analyst
disagreement about future earnings represents a measure of uncertainty about rm value and nd
that rms with more diverse analysts forecasts of future earnings have lower credit ratings. Francis
et al. (2008) investigate the relations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of
capital.
9
Yu (2005) examines the relation between the quality of a rm's information
disclosure and the term structure of its bond yield spreads. Using the same AIMR
rating as Sengupta (1998), Yu (2005) documents that the credit spread is negatively
related to the quality of disclosure. This relation is stronger if the maturity of debt
is short, consistent with the structural credit risk model of Due and Lando (2001).
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) nd that bond yields are negatively associated with
the percentage of shares held by institutions and the fraction of the board made up
by non-ocers. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) assume that governance mechanisms
reduce potential conicts of interest between management and providers of capital
through eective monitoring management's actions (`active monitoring' hypothesis).
However they nd that concentrated institutional ownership has an adverse impact
on bond yields as the decisions made by the rm could be inuenced by these insti-
tutions to their own advantage (`private benets' hypothesis).10 In particular, large
shareholders may exercise their inuence over management to expropriate wealth
from (minor shareholders and) bondholders.11
Anderson et al. (2004) relate the cost of debt to characteristics of the board
10Many hypotheses in literature refer to (partly) the same eects or actions. We list a few hy-
potheses here: the `active monitoring' hypothesis states that the existence of large shareholders
leads to better monitoring of managers (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990, see also Demsetz, 1983 and
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), while according to the `passive monitoring' hypothesis large investors
have limited incentives to monitor management actions due to the free-riding problem among large
investors (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). The `management disciplining' hypothesis refers to the
role governance plays in mitigating the agency conicts between management and all stakeholders
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). The `wealth redistribution' hypothesis states that certain gover-
nance features can be benecial for shareholders but potentially harmful to bondholders and vice
versa (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). The `private benets' hypothesis states that concentrated
ownership \...allows the blockholder to exercise undue inuence over the management to secure
benets that are to the detriment of the other providers of capital (shareholders and bondhold-
ers)." (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003, p.457.) Finally, the `shared benets' hypothesis suggests
that concentrated ownership leads to more ecient monitoring and that benets are shared by all
stockholders (ibid).
11Examples of wealth expropriation of bondholders are the approval of mergers and acquisitions
that only serve the interests of shareholders (Asquith and Wizman, 1990; Warga and Welch, 1993;
and Billet et al., 2004) and asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). See King and Wen
(2010) for an examination of the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and
managerial risk-taking behavior.
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and document a negative relation between the cost of debt and board independence
and board size. They also nd that \...fully independent audit committees are
associated with a signicantly lower cost of debt nancing. Similarly, yield spreads
are also negatively related to audit committee size and meeting frequency. Overall,
these results provide market-based evidence that boards and audit committees are
important elements aecting the reliability of nancial reports." (ibid, p.315).12
Klock et al. (2005) examine the relation between the Gompers et al. (2003) gov-
ernance index and rm value from the perspective of bondholders.13 According to
Klock et al. (2005) the expected relation is not straightforward as anti-takeover pro-
visions might inuence the value of debt in several dierent ways. First, takeovers
could reduce the cost of debt as a result of co-insurance (see Billet et al., 2004).
Anti-takeover provisions could in this perspective be negative for the value of debt,
since this co-insurance eect (which is positive for the debtholders of the target)
is prohibited by the use of the anti-takeover provisions. Second, a takeover could
have a negative eect on bondholders' wealth and increase the cost of debt if, for
example, management increases leverage or increases the payout (excess cash) to
shareholders (on behalf of the shareholders) after the takeover. Third, anti-takeover
provisions could improve capital investment decisions,14 which have a positive inu-
12According to John and Senbet (1998) the eectiveness of the board in its monitoring function
is determined by its independence, size, and composition. Millstein and MacAvoy (1998) nd that
rms that have a higher quality structure and performance of the supervisory board overall perform
better than rms that have a low quality structure and performance.
13Gompers et al. (2003) study the inuence of corporate governance on stock returns. Using 24
anti-takeover indicators, the authors compose a governance index, which is used to estimate the
shareholders rights for approximately 1500 US rms in the period 1990-1999. A low index score
implies stronger shareholder rights (weak antitakeover provisions) and a high score vice-versa. The
authors nd a signicantly negative relation between this index and stock returns. Furthermore
rms with stronger shareholder rights have higher rm value, higher prots, higher sales growth,
lower capital expenditures, and made fewer acquisitions. Bauer et al. (2004) perform the same
kind of analysis for Europe (EMU countries versus UK). Instead of using anti-takeover indicators,
Bauer et al. (2004) use the Deminor corporate governance rating (total score) for 2000 and 2001
instead. Bauer et al. (2004) nd some evidence that governance aects stock returns positively for
UK rms but not for EMU countries. The impact of corporate governance on rm value is rather
strong for EMU rms but not for the UK.
14Stein's (1988) model suggests that managers of sheltered rms are more likely to invest in R&D
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ence on shareholder and bondholder wealth and decrease the cost of debt. Fourth,
if takeover defences make managers invulnerable to the market for corporate control
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983), this could have a negative impact on rm performance
(because of e.g. shirking of eort) as well as on the wealth of the shareholders and
bondholders. This would increase the cost of debt. Fifth, anti-takeover provisions
may decrease the risk of the rm and cost of debt if managers invest less in risky
projects to protect their job and to reduce their human capital risk (Amihud and
Lev, 1981). In sum, takeover defences may have both positive and negative eects
on the cost of debt. The empirical results in Klock et al. (2005) suggest that the
positive eects dominate, as the cost of debt of rms with the strongest management
rights (strongest anti-takeover provisions) is found to be 34 basis points lower on av-
erage than the cost of debt for rms with the strongest shareholder rights (weakest
anti-takeover provisions).
Cremers et al. (2007) document a complimentary interaction eect between share-
holder control and takeover defences. They nd that shareholder control (proxied
by large institutional block holders) is associated with lower (higher) yields if the
rm is protected from (exposed to) takeovers. Chava et al. (2009) nd that lower
takeover defences signicantly increase the cost of bank loans. Banks would charge
a higher loan spread to rms with higher takeover vulnerability mainly because of
their concern about a substantial increase in nancial risk after a takeover.15
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) structure their analysis by using a framework de-
veloped by Standard & Poor's.16 They nd that rms' overall credit ratings are 1)
negatively associated with the number of blockholders that own at least 5% own-
like projects. Harris (1990) shows that e.g. golden parachutes positively inuences managerial
investment in specialized human capital benecial for the shareholders.
15For an evaluation of the impact of alternative ownership models on the protability, cost
eciency and risk of European banks, see Iannotta et al. (2007).
16This framework focuses on four major components of governance: Ownership Structure and
Inuence, Financial Stakeholder Rights and Relations, Financial transparency and Board Structure
and Processes (Standard & Poor's, 2002).
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ership in the rm; 2) positively related to weaker shareholder rights in terms of
takeover defences; 3) positively related to the quality of `working capital accruals'
and the `timeliness of earnings'; and 4) positively related to overall board indepen-
dence, board stock ownership, board expertise and negatively related to CEO power
on the board. These relations are explained by the eect of the selected variables on
agency conicts between external stakeholders (bondholders and shareholders) and
management ('management disciplining' hypothesis) and potential conicts between
bondholders and shareholders ('wealth redistribution' hypothesis).
The prior empirical research discussed above documents - in general - a negative
relation between the cost of debt and the quality of dierent corporate governance
mechanisms, possibly with the exception of Takeover defences. Based on these nd-
ings we expect a negative relation between the cost of debt and the quality of Share-
holder rights, Board, and Disclosure, and a positive relation between the cost of debt
and the Takeover defences score. Following the management disciplining hypothesis,
we expect that - as long as the interests of shareholders and bondholders are aligned
- rms with high scores for Shareholder rights have lower costs of debt. A negative
relation between Board and the cost of debt may be expected due to the benecial
eects of a sound board composition, board size, and independence of committees.
For disclosure, improved transparency would lead to a lower cost of debt through
the reduction of information risk. The relation between Takeover defences and the
cost of debt is expected to be positive based on Klock et al.'s (2005) nding that a
higher probability of a successful takeover increases the cost of debt.
As argued by Cremers and Nair (2005), dierent corporate governance mecha-
nisms do not operate in isolation but work together in a system. Hence, it is not
unlikely that dierent components interact to aect the cost of (equity and) debt. In
fact, as discussed before, Cremers and Nair (2005) and Cremers et al. (2007) docu-
ment a complimentary eect of shareholder control and takeover defences for the cost
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of equity and the cost of debt, respectively. Similarly, Cheng et al. (2006) demon-
strate that both shareholder rights and disclosure lead to a lower cost of equity, with
each of these eects being more pronounced when also the other governance mech-
anism is of high quality. Given the limited evidence in the empirical literature on
interaction eects between governance mechanisms and the cost of debt we refrain
ourselves from predicting signs of these interactions. Governance mechanisms might
strengthen each other, but could also work as substitutes.
4 Models and data
4.1 Models
We examine the inuence of a rm's corporate governance quality on its cost of debt
and in particular the possible interactions between the four governance character-
istics by means of regression analysis. Specically, following Sengupta (1998), we
relate the cost of debt issued in year t+ 1 to the quality of corporate governance in
year t and a number of control variables. As proxy for the cost of debt we use the
yield spread (SPREAD), dened as the yield to maturity of a newly issued corporate
bond (YIELD) minus the yield to maturity of a government bond issued at the same
date, in the same currency and of similar maturity. The SPREAD is measured on
the rst day of the bond issue.
For the quality of corporate governance we use the Deminor ratings for Share-
holder rights, Takeover defences, Board structure and Disclosure, or the total gov-
ernance score, as discussed in Section 2.
We include several control variables in our regression models, comprising is-
sue characteristics (issue size, maturity, and special features of the debt), issuer
characteristics (leverage, protability, interest coverage, size, and risk), and market
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characteristics (the yield spread of Moody's Aaa bonds), which have been found to
be important determinants of bond yields and ratings in previous literature.17 To
correct for the relatively high governance scores of UK rms we include a UK coun-
try dummy. Finally, we also include year dummies to avoid that the positive trend
in governance ratings (see Section 2) and the negative trend in yields and spreads
during the sample period may lead to spurious results.
Our regression analysis involves two types of models. Specically, we consider
linear specications of the form
yi;t+1 = + 
0xi;t + 0zi;t + "i;t+1; (1)
where yi;t+1 is the SPREAD on a bond issued by rm i in year t + 1, xi;t is a
vector of governance scores, zi;t is a vector of control variables. We do not impose
strict assumptions on the shocks "i;t+1. In particular, we allow for general forms of
heteroskedasticity across rms and over time by using White's heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Furthermore, since bonds issued by dierent rms in the
same country may be subject to the same macroeconomic shocks, we cluster the
standard errors at the country level.
The vector xi;t contains the Deminor scores for the specic governance dimen-
sions Shareholder rights, Takeover, Board and Disclosure. In order to examine the
presence of interaction eects between the four dierent governance mechanisms,
we estimate models that include a single interaction term as well as a model that
includes all six possible interaction terms.18 As discussed in Section 3, we expect
negative coecients for Shareholder rights, Disclosure and Board individually and a
17See Fisher (1959), Jaee (1975), Sorensen (1979), Boardman and McEnally (1981), Kidwell et
al. (1984), Wilson and Howard (1984), Fung and Rudd (1986), Lamy and Thompson (1988), Feroz
and Wilson (1992), Ziebart and Reiter (1992), Sengupta (1998), and Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003),
among others.
18We do not include squares of the individual governance scores due to high collinearity with the
scores themselves.
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positive coecient for Takeover defences. We leave the interaction terms unsigned.
Signicant coecients for the interaction terms in the linear regression (1) may
arise for dierent reasons. For example, a negative coecient for the interaction
term between Shareholder rights and Takeover defences may be due to the fact that
these governance mechanisms mutually reinforce each other. However, it may also
be the case that Shareholder rights become an eective mechanmism for lowering
the cost of debt only when a certain level of Takeover defences is in place, as sug-
gested by Cremers et al. (2007). In order to examine the nature of the interaction
eects between dierent corporate governance mechanisms in more detail, we apply
threshold models of the form
yi;t+1 = + 
0
1xi;tI[qi;t  r] + 02xi;tI[qi;t > r] + 0zi;t + "i;t+1; (2)
where I[A] is an indicator function that is equal to 1 in case the event A occurs and
0 otherwise. The specication in (2) allows the coecients of the governance scores
to be dierent depending on whether the variable qi;t takes a value below or above
the threshold r.
We use this threshold model as an alternative way to examine the presence of
interaction eects between dierent governance mechanisms. This is achieved by
using each of the four governance scores as the threshold variable qi;t, where we
test the null that the coecients of the governance scores, both individually and
simultaneously, are the same for values of qi;t above and below the threshold r. The
attractive feature of the threshold regression approach is that the threshold value
r need not be specied a priori, but can be estimated along with the other model
parameters using least squares. The estimation boils down to a grid search across
dierent values of r, making use of the fact that the model is linear in the remaining
coecients when the threshold is xed. In all cases, we limit the grid search by the
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15th and 85th percentiles of the empirical distribution of the threshold variable.
The estimation procedure also allows us to construct a Wald test of the null
hypothesis that the coecients of the governance scores do not depend on the value
of qi;t, i.e. H0 : 1 = 2. Due to the fact that the threshold value r is not identied
under the null hypothesis, the asymptotic distribution of this Wald statistic is not
standard, see Andrews (1993) and Hansen (1996) for a general treatment. Here we
use the xed regressor bootstrap procedure of Hansen (2000) to obtain appropriate
p-values, which are robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and instability in
the governance scores xi;t.
4.2 Data
Information on bond issues in 2001-2009 is obtained from Bloomberg. Companies
that issued bonds in either Japanese Yen (JPY) or a Floating Rate Note (FRN) are
removed because of their strongly deviating yields. The yield of JPY-denominated
bonds is low throughout the sample period, and the yield of the FRN uctuates
along with the market interest rate. This complicates a comparison to the other
observations in our sample. We further exclude a few specic bond issues for which
no reliable data could be obtained about the identity of the issuing entity. Taken
together, these data screens result in a sample of 542 bond issues by 186 unique
rms from 17 European countries.19
For the control variables, the issue characteristics of the 542 bonds (size, matu-
rity, callable, convertible and subordinated) are obtained from Bloomberg. All the
issue amounts (size) are converted to euros, using exchange rates on the issue date.
The issuer characteristics are obtained from various sources. Precise denitions of
the control variables and their expected relations with the cost of debt are listed
19Austria (5 issues), Belgium (8), Switzerland (26), Denmark (1), Finland (9), France (127),
Germany (72), Greece (1), Ireland(4), Italy (23), Luxembourg (3), The Netherlands (37), Norway
(7), Portugal (3), Spain (26), Sweden (32), and United Kingdom (158).
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in Table A.1 in the Appendix. For the market condition variables we obtain the
yield of a comparable government bond (same maturity) in the same currency as
the issued bond. European government bonds are used for bond issues in euros
(source: Ecowin). In addition, Moody's Aaa-rated bonds are used as well as U.S.
government bonds with the longest maturity. For each observation in the sample,
the TREASURY and BC variables are calculated for the day of the particular debt
issue.
We winsorize all variables except the governance ratings in order to mitigate the
eect of outliers in our regression models. Observations exceeding the mean plus or
minus three times the standard deviation are set to this value.
Table A.2 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics for all variables used
in the analysis, including the mean, median, standard deviation and the 25th and
75th percentiles. The table shows that the mean SPREAD is 0.50%, whereas the
mean YIELD is 4.33%. The median issue size is 500 million and the median time to
maturity is 7 years. Twelve percent of the observations are bonds that are callable
or convertible, while only seven percent of the issues concern subordinated debt.
The median size of the rms (total assets in book value) is about 24 billion.
Table A.3 in the Appendix shows Pearson correlation coecients among the
variables. The correlation coecients between the independent variables are all
fairly small, with the exception of the Disclosure and Board scores. The correlation
between these governance measures is 0.83.20 Obviously, of particular interest are
the correlations between the SPREAD as our proxy for the cost of debt and the
corporate governance scores. We observe that all these correlations are negative,
although their magnitude is quite modest. Board and Disclosure have the strongest
link with the SPREAD variable, with correlations of  0:17 and  0:18.
20Accounting for year eects and the UK eect, the correlation declines to 0.62.
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5 Main results
5.1 Linear regression model
The estimation results for the linear regression model as given in (1) are shown in
Table 4.21 Columns [1] and [2] contain results for the model without interaction
terms between the governance variables. Strikingly, these results do not show any
relation between the cost of debt and the total governance score or the scores for
individual governance components. However, including all six interaction terms - in
addition to the individual governance measures - we nd signicant coecients for
the governance measures Shareholder rights and Disclosure individually as well as
for their interaction term. The coecients for Board and Takeover defences are not
signicant, just like any of the (ve other) interaction terms involving one of these
governance components.22;23 The same ndings are obtained with the regression
models that include a single interaction term only.
Focusing on the interaction term between Disclosure and Shareholder rights col-
umn [3] in Table 4 shows the estimation results of the more parsimonious speci-
cation that only includes this interaction term. The coecients for Disclosure and
Shareholder rights have the expected negative sign, while the coecient of the in-
teraction term between Disclosure and Shareholder is positive. All three coecients
21To save space, we do not show the estimated coecients for the year dummies and the UK
dummy. These are available upon request.
22The estimated coecients for Board and Takeover defences are 0:145 and 0:079. For the
interaction terms of Takeover defences and Shareholder rights, Board and Shareholder rights, Board
and Takeover defences, Disclosure and Takeover defences, and Disclosure and Board the estimates
are  0:002,  0:021,  0:006,  0:004, 0:000, all being insignicant at the 10% level. The smallest
p-value for the interaction terms is 0.58.
23To further check the robustness of the linear regression results we estimate the model omitting
utility rms (which tend to be regulated and may have dierent features of governance mechanisms),
and omitting rms that issue either convertible, callable or subordinated bonds. In both cases,
the (untabulated) results show signicant coecients for Shareholder rights, Disclosure and their
interaction. If we use the YIELD instead of the SPREAD - as in Sengupta (1998)- we again nd
negative coecients for Shareholder rights and Disclosure that are signicant at the 1% level, while
the interaction term itself has a signicantly positive coecient of 0.033.
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are signicantly dierent from zero even at the 1% level (based on a two-sided test).
Thus, while higher scores for Disclosure and Shareholder rights individually lead
to a reduction in the cost of debt, their interaction appears to increase the cost of
capital.24
The magnitudes of the coecient estimates for Shareholder rights ( 0:255), Dis-
closure ( 0:300) and for their interaction term (0.040) can be used to assess the
economic signicance of the interaction between these corporate governance mea-
sures on the cost of debt. For example, on average the spread on bond issues is
approximately 6.8 basis points lower ( 0:300 + 5:81  0:040) for each point in-
crease in the Disclosure score for rms at the lower quartile of the Shareholder
rights scores.25 By contrast, for rms at the upper quartile of the Shareholder rights
scores, each point increase in Disclosure leads to an increase in the spread of 1.0
basis point ( 0:300 + 7:76  0:040). Firms with relatively weak shareholder rights
can reduce their cost of debt by improving their disclosure, while this is not the case
for rms with strong shareholder rights. Conversely, rms at the lower quartile of
Disclosure (5.91) can reduce the spread on bond issues by approximately 1.9 basis
points ( 0:255 + 5:91  0:040) for each point increase in their Shareholder rights
score. For rms at the upper quartile of the Disclosure scores, each point increase in
Shareholder rights leads to an increase in the spread of no less than 7.1 basis points
( 0:255 + 8:16 0:040).
- insert Table 4 about here -
As discussed in the previous section, the signicant interaction term between
24Including additional industry dummies does not aect the results. In this case the estimated
coecients for Shareholder rights, Disclosure and the interaction term are  0:297,  0:310 and
0.044, with all three coecients again being signicant at the 1% level. As only two of the 23
industry coecients are signicant, we do not consider industry eects in the remainder of the
analysis.
25The 25th percentile observation for the governance measure Shareholder rights is 5.81, see
Table A.2.
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Shareholder rights and Disclosure may be due to dierent mechanisms. It may be
that the substitution eect is two-way, as just described. On the other hand, it may
also reect a unidirectional eect, with increased Shareholder rights reducing the cost
of debt only if Disclosure is low or vice versa. In the next subsection we estimate
threshold models to determine the nature of the interaction between Disclosure and
Shareholder rights more precisely.
Finally, all signicant coecients for the included control variables have their
expected signs. Bond issues with a longer maturity have a higher cost of debt,
as well as subordinated bonds and non-convertible bonds. The fact that a debt
issue involves subordinated bonds, increases the credit spread by 42 basis points,
on average, see column [3] of Table 4. The spread for convertibles is 2.450% lower
compared with non-convertible bonds.26 Concerning the issuer characteristics, we
conrm previous ndings that the cost of debt increases with leverage and risk of
equity, while it declines with protability and size.
5.2 Threshold regression model
We use the threshold regression model given in (2) to obtain more insight into the
nature of the interaction between Disclosure and Shareholder rights. In addition we
again explore the possibility of other interaction eects by testing the null hypothe-
sis 1 = 2 in (2) using each of the four governance measures as threshold variable.
We conduct the test for all four governance measures jointly and for each of them
individually (while assuming that the coecients of the other three governance char-
acteristics do not change according to the value of the threshold variable). In order
to account for the gradual increase of the governance scores over time as well as
26Excluding the convertible, callable and subordinated bonds from the estimation sample does
not aect the results for the corporate governance characteristics. In column [3], we nd that the
coecient for Shareholder rights in this case is  0:225 (t-value  1:801), for Disclosure  0:327
(t-value  2:996) and for the interaction term 0:040 (t-value 2.253).
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the high scores for UK rms, the governance variables are cleaned from these eects
when they are used as threshold variable.27
Table 5 presents p-values of the heteroskedasticity-consistent Wald test of the
relevant null hypothesis. The p-values are obtained by means of the xed regressor
bootstrap procedure with 999 bootstrap replications.
- insert Tables 5 and 6 about here -
The only signicant test statistics (at the 5% level) occur when Shareholder
rights is used as threshold variable. Testing equality of the coecients of all four
governance variables jointly results in a test statistic with a p-value of 0.024. Testing
the specic governance scores individually, we reject the null hypothesis of linearity
for Disclosure but also for Shareholder rights and for Board. We return to this
issue below. Concentrating rst on the interaction between Shareholder rights and
Disclosure, we note that no evidence for a changing eect on the cost of debt is
obtained for Shareholder rights in case Disclosure is the threshold variable. This
suggests that the signicant interaction term in the linear regression is due to the
fact that the level of Shareholder rights inuences the relation between Disclosure
and the cost of debt but not the other way around.
Table 6 shows estimation results for the threshold model when the coecients of
all four corporate governance measures are allowed to vary with Shareholder rights
acting as the variable qi;t. The eect of Disclosure indeed depends remarkably on the
level of Shareholder rights, in the sense that the coecient estimate for Disclosure
27We remove the time and UK eects from the governance scores by estimating the auxiliary
regression
xi;t = 0 +
8X
j=1
j(Dit(1999 + j)  Dit(2008)) + UK(Dit(UK)  D(non-UK)) + i;t; (3)
where xi;t is the governance score for rm i in year t, Dit(1999+j) are dummy variables for the year
1999+j (j = 0; 1; : : : ; 9), and Dit(UK) and D(non-UK) are dummy variables for UK and non-UK
rms, respectively. We then use ^0 + ^ij;t as the threshold variable qi;t.
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is signicantly negative at  0:186 when Shareholder rights is below the threshold
level of around 6, while it is equal to  0:014 and not signicant for higher values of
Shareholder rights. Testing the null hypothesis that the two coecients are equal
by means of a heteroskedasticity-consistent Wald test renders a p-value of 0.088. In
economic terms, the estimation results imply that for rms with shareholder rights
below the threshold the credit spread decreases with 42 basis points if we move from
the lower quartile to the upper quartile of disclosure ( 0:186  (8:16   5:91)). As
indicated in Table 6, the estimate of the threshold r is such that Shareholder rights
is below this value for 119 observations. Hence, the eect of disclosure is relevant
for about one quarter of the rms in our sample.
It is also interesting from Table 6 to note the changing eects of Shareholder rights
and Board. The coecient for Shareholder rights is  0:229 for rms with low Share-
holder rights and 0:149 for rms with high Shareholder rights. A heteroskedasticity-
consistent Wald test of the null that these coecients are equal renders a p-value
of 0.251. Hence, we cannot reject the null that the relation of Shareholder rights
with the cost of debt is linear. The relation between the cost of debt and Board also
is not inuenced by the level of Shareholder rights, in the sense that the eect of
Board on the cost of debt is insignicant under both regimes. At rst sight, it may
seem that the conclusions drawn here concerning the eects of Shareholder rights
and Board on the cost of debt are inconsistent with the results of the linearity tests
reported in Table 5. The small p-values of 0.010 and 0.034 for Shareholder rights and
Board, respectively, suggest that linearity can be rejected in favor of a nonlinear re-
lation that depends on the level of Shareholder rights. Note however that these tests
are conducted under the assumption that the eects of the other three governance
mechanisms are linear. Apparently, neglecting the nonlinear eects of Disclosure on
the cost of debt leads to a spurious rejection of linearity for Shareholder rights and
Board.
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In sum, the threshold regression analysis together with the fact that the test
results in Table 5 conrm a unidirectional interaction eect between Shareholder
rights and Disclosure and do not indicate the presence of threshold eects for other
variables.
5.3 A possible explanation: The `share rights or disclose'
hypothesis
In order to explain the unidirectional interaction eect between Shareholder rights
and Disclosure we introduce the `share rights or disclose' hypothesis. This hypothesis
states that the relation between the cost of debt and Disclosure is nonlinear and
crucially depends on the quality of shareholder rights. In particular, an increased
level of disclosure reduces the cost of debt only when the level of shareholder rights
is low.
More specically, the reasoning is as follows. If the quality of shareholder rights
is high, agency risk and information risk are relatively low. The high level of share-
holder rights enforces better managerial decision making, which should benet all
providers of capital, holders of equity and debt. In this case the need for a high
quality of disclosure for the providers of debt is as such reduced. Shareholders take
care. In other words, the more rights shareholders have to discipline management,
the less important disclosure becomes for the providers of debt. However if agency
risk is high because of a low quality of shareholder rights, there is more need for
a high quality of Disclosure. In this situation providers of debt should be able to
estimate the value and risks of the assets in place and growth opportunities of the
rm by themselves. We expect that rms that score low on Shareholder rights face
a higher credit spread if their score for Disclosure also is low, as providers of debt
would require compensation for the uncertainty about the true value of the rm,
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cf. Due and Lando (2001). Firms that do not share rights with shareholders but
communicate relatively well, and thereby reduce information risk, are rewarded with
a lower cost of debt.
6 Further analysis and robustness checks
6.1 The role of credit quality
We examine the inuence of the credit quality of the issuer on the relevance of the
`share rights or disclose' hypothesis. This is motivated by the idea that the level of
agency problems between shareholders and the holders of debt depends on a rm's
creditworthiness (see Bradley and Chen, 2010). If a rm is of high quality, the inter-
ests of shareholders and bondholders are more aligned with each other and, therefore,
stronger shareholder rights may lead to lower costs of debt. However, when a rm
is nancially distressed more power for shareholders would exacerbate a possible
conict with bondholders. For this purpose we estimate the linear regression model
with the interaction term between Shareholder rights and Disclosure for subsamples
formed according to the value of the issuer's interest coverage ratio and volatility
being below or above its median. We assume a positive relation between the cred-
itworthiness of the rm and the interest coverage ratio and a negative relation with
equity's volatility.
- insert Table 7 about here -
The results are reported in Table 7.28 The results in columns [1]-[4] show that the
magnitudes of the coecients of shareholder rights, disclosure, and their interaction
28To save space, in Table 7 (and all subsequent tables with results of robustness checks) we only
show the coecient estimates for the corporate governance variables. The estimates for the control
variables are similar to those in the corresponding models in Table 4. Detailed results are available
upon request.
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are signicant for high (low) levels of interest coverage (volatility) and not signicant
for low (high) levels. This is in line with the hypothesis of Bradley and Chen (2010)
and suggests that the share rights or disclose hypothesis is valid especially for rms
of high credit quality.
6.2 The role of maturity
As stated in Section 3, using secondary market yields Yu (2005) nds that the
relation between the credit spread and disclosure is inuenced by the maturity of
debt. The inuence of transparency on the spread is especially large if the maturity
of debt is short, consistent with the structural credit risk model of Due and Lando
(2001). We examine whether a similar maturity eect is present for the interaction
between Shareholder rights and Disclosure for the spreads of newly issued bonds.
Following Yu (2005), we estimate the linear regression model as given in (1) but
now including additional interaction terms with the maturity of debt. In particular,
starting from model [3] in Table 4, we add an interaction term between the logarithm
of the bond maturity and Disclosure or Shareholder rights, while we also consider a
model that includes both interaction terms plus a threefold interaction term between
log maturity, Shareholder rights and Disclosure. Finally, we estimate the original
specication but for subsamples of observations for which maturity is below and
above the median.
The results are reported in Table 8. In column [1], the coecient for the inter-
action between Disclosure and Maturity is positive and signicant at the 5% level.
This implies that the negative relation between the spread and disclosure becomes
weaker as the maturity of the newly issued bond increases, in line with the ndings
of Yu (2005). The results in column [2] suggest that the inuence of Shareholder
rights does not depend on maturity, as the coecient of their interaction term is not
signicant even at the 10% level. The interaction term between maturity and Share-
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holder rights is signicantly positive in column [3] though, when the interaction term
between maturity and Disclosure also is included as well, together with the threefold
interaction term between maturity, Shareholder rights and Disclosure. For the latter
we nd a negative coecient of  0:057. This negative coecient is consistent with
the results for Disclosure and Shareholder rights separately and suggests that the
interaction between Disclosure and Shareholder rights weakens for debt with longer
maturities. The results in columns [4] and [5] convincingly demonstrate that this
indeed is the case. Limiting the estimation sample to observations with a maturity
below its median (which is equal to 7 years), we nd highly signicant negative
coecients for Shareholder rights and Disclosure separately and a signicantly pos-
itive coecient for their interaction term. The coecient of the interaction term
is equal to 0:064, or 60 percent larger in magnitude than for the full sample, see
column [3] in Table 4. By contrast, none of the governance variables is signicant
if the model is estimated for the subsample of observations with maturity above its
median. Note that the coecient of the interaction term between Shareholder rights
and Disclosure is equal to zero up to the third decimal.
In sum, our results conrm Yu's (2005) ndings that the impact of governance
on the cost of debt is stronger for shorter maturities than for longer maturities.
We document that this is not limited to the eect of Disclosure itself, but applies
equally well to its interaction eect with Shareholder rights. Hence, the `share rights
or disclose' hypothesis seems relevant especially for short-term debt.
- insert Table 8 about here -
6.3 The role of the board structure
As noted in Section 4, the correlation between Disclosure and the governance mea-
sure Board structure is rather high at 0.83. This raises the question whether our
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previous results on the role of Disclosure might in fact be due to the (interaction)
eects of Board structure (with Shareholder rights). In order to address this issue
we estimate the linear regression model in (1) again i) without the Board structure
variable and ii) including an (additional) interaction term between Board structure
and Shareholder rights. The results, shown in Table 9, conrm our previous ndings.
In column [2], we observe negative coecients for Shareholder rights and Board and
a positive coecient for their interaction term, mimicking the results in column [3]
in Table 4, with the dierence that here the coecient for Board is insignicant.
Including both interaction terms (column [3] in Table 9), we again nd signicantly
negative coecients for Shareholder rights and Disclosure and a signicantly positive
coecient for their interaction term. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the coecients
are comparable to those in column [3] in Table 4. In addition, the interaction term
between Board structure and Shareholder rights is not signicantly dierent from
zero. Hence, we conclude that our ndings are not due to neglected eects of Board
structure.
- insert Table 9 about here -
7 Conclusion
We examine the eects of four corporate governance mechanisms, namely (i) share-
holder rights, (ii) takeover defences, (iii) board structure and functioning and (iv)
disclosure on the cost of debt for large European rms, focusing on the possibility of
interaction eects between the dierent governance mechanisms. We document a sig-
nicant negative relation between the quality of disclosure and the cost of debt, but
only if shareholder rights are low. No other interaction eects have been revealed.
The interaction between shareholder rights and disclosure is possibly explained by
our `share rights or disclose' hypothesis, which states that a high quality of share-
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holder rights lowers the possibility of agency conicts between management and the
providers of capital (following the `management disciplining' hypothesis), resulting
in a lower level of information risk and a reduced need for disclosure. Information
risk is lower then, because shareholders will prevent managers to make decisions
that will shift rm's distribution of future cash ows downward and they can make
corrective actions afterwards, if needed. On the other hand, if shareholder rights
are low, information risk increases and providers of debt reward rms with a lower
cost of debt if they give them more insight in their nancial situation, that is, if
they reduce the uncertainty about the true rm value by means of a high quality
of disclosure. Alternatively, if shareholder rights are low and the quality of disclo-
sure also is low, the rm is like a black box and the perceived information risk by
the bondholders is relatively high. This interaction eect between these governance
mechanisms is relevant mostly for bonds with a short maturity and for rms with
a high creditworthiness. We do not nd evidence for any relation between takeover
defences nor the board structure and the cost of debt.
29
Appendix A Descriptive statistics and correlations
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Table A.1: Control variable denitions and expected signs of relation with the cost
of debt
Variable Denition and predicted sign
Issue characteristics
LNSIZE Logarithm of the issue amount; as a result of the size-eect the
measure for the cost of debt is expected to be negatively related
to the issue amount.
LNMATUR Logarithm of the maturity; bonds with a longer maturity are ex-
pected to have a higher yield, because of the increased exposure
to interest rate risk.
CALL Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the obligation is callable
and 0 if the bond is not callable from the date of issue. The issuer
of the bond will have to pay extra if the bond is callable; therefore
a positive relation between CALL and the spread is expected.
CONVERT Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the obligation is convertible
into shares, otherwise 0; convertible bonds are expected to have
a lower spread, because part of the compensation for investors
comes from the value of the option.
SUBORD Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the bond is subordinated,
otherwise 0; subordinated bonds are expected to have a higher
spread.
Issuer characteristics
DE Book value of long term interest bearing debt divided by the mar-
ket value of equity at the end of year t; rms with a higher DE
ratio are expected to have a higher spread.
MARGIN Net income before preferred dividends in year t divided by net
sales or revenues in year t; rms with a higher prot margin are
expected to have a lower spread.
TIMES The sum of net income before interest and tax expense of year t
divided by interest expense in year t; rms with a higher ratio are
expected to have a lower spread.
LNASSET Natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of year t; larger
rms are expected to have a lower spread.
STDRETN Standard deviation of the daily stock return in year t corrected
for dividends and stock splits. Standard deviation is a measure
of total risk of equity. We assume a positive relation with the
spread.
Market characteristics
TREASURY Yield to maturity of a government bond at the same date, in
the same currency and of similar maturity; we expect a positive
relation between the yields of the issued bonds and the treasury
bonds.
BC Yield (on the date of the company's bond issue) on Moody's US
Aaa-bonds minus the yield on US government bonds with the
longest maturity (also on the date of issue); the yield and spread
of the issued bond are expected to increase with an increase of
BC. We assume this U.S. risk spread is related to the European
risk spread.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean St.dev. Median 25% 75%
SPREAD 0:50 1:31 0:65 0:00 1:14
YIELD 4:33 1:54 4:33 3:23 5:36
RATE 3:47 0:91 3:00 3:00 4:00
LNSIZE 20:05 0:98 20:21 19:73 20:72
LNMATURITY 1:96 0:49 1:95 1:61 2:30
CALL 0:12 0:32 0:00 0:00 0:00
CONVERT 0:07 0:25 0:00 0:00 0:00
SUBORD 0:03 0:17 0:00 0:00 0:00
D/E 0:43 0:44 0:29 0:14 0:58
MARGIN 7:04 9:52 6:47 3:38 11:09
TIMES 6:66 7:83 4:93 2:97 8:90
LNASSET 23:90 1:02 23:84 23:14 24:57
STDRETN 2:20 0:99 2:02 1:40 2:70
TREASURY 3:83 0:92 3:93 3:21 4:59
BC 1:01 0:46 0:92 0:61 1:28
Governance total 23:80 6:49 23:52 18:94 28:99
Shareholder rights 6:68 1:32 7:01 5:81 7:76
Takeover defences 4:42 3:65 4:00 1:00 8:00
Board structure 5:78 1:67 6:09 4:51 7:17
Disclosure 6:92 1:61 7:31 5:91 8:16
Note: This table provides summary statistics for the variables employed in
the analysis for the cost of debt of 542 bond issues over the period 2001-
2009. The variables are dened as follows: SPREAD is the dierence between
YIELD and TREASURY; YIELD is the yield to maturity at issue date; RATE
is the credit rating of the issue (on a scale from 1-9, with a higher value
indicating a lower rating); LNSIZE is natural log of the issue amount in
euros; LNMATURITY is the natural log of number of years to maturity of
the issued bonds; CALL = 1 if the bonds are callable, 0 otherwise; CONVERT
= 1 if the bonds are convertible, 0 otherwise; SUBORD = 1 if the debt is
subordinate, 0 otherwise; D/E is the book value of long term interest bearing
debt at the end of year t divided by the market value of common stock at the
end of year t; MARGIN the sum of net income before extraordinary items and
equity income of year t divided by net sales in year t; TIMES is the sum of net
income before interest and tax expense of year t divided by interest expense
in year t; LNASSET is the natural log of book value of total assets at the end
of year t in euros; STDRETN is the standard deviation of daily stock returns
in year t corrected for dividends and stock splits; TREASURY is the yield
(on the bond issue date) of government bonds in the same currency and with
approximately the same maturity as the issued bond; BC is the yield (on the
date of the company's bond issue) on Moody's Aaa-bonds minus the yield on
U.S. government bonds with the longest maturity (also on the date of issue);
Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Board and Disclosure are Deminor's
corporate governance scores for the four categories; Governance total is the
sum of the four governance scores.
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Table 1: Corporate governance scores per year
Shareholder Takeover Board
Year Total rights defences structure Disclosure N
2000 19:36 (6:24) 5:78 3:77 4:61 5:20 61
2001 21:93 (6:71) 6:50 5:07 4:74 5:62 62
2002 21:05 (6:25) 6:31 3:80 4:87 6:07 96
2003 22:98 (6:00) 6:54 4:02 5:50 6:91 48
2004 24:06 (5:38) 6:76 4:05 6:01 7:24 52
2005 27:13 (5:83) 7:10 5:52 6:74 7:77 42
2006 26:71 (5:53) 6:93 5:02 6:73 8:03 49
2007 28:19 (5:07) 7:37 5:60 6:98 8:24 52
2008 25:88 (5:31) 7:19 3:90 6:70 8:09 80
All 23:80 (6:49) 6:68 4:42 5:78 6:92 542
Note: The table presents the mean of the Deminor corporate governance
scores per year for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Board and Dis-
closure, with the standard deviation in parentheses. The rightmost column
shows the number of observations N .
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Table 2: Corporate governance scores by country
Shareholder Takeover Board
Year Total rights defences structure Disclosure N
Austria 18:07 (2:74) 6:40 1:09 4:28 6:31 5
Belgium 19:27 (4:90) 6:25 2:08 5:31 5:63 8
Switzerland 20:59 (6:81) 6:24 3:47 5:15 5:73 26
Denmark 17:79 ( ) 5:48 1:00 5:13 6:18 1
Finland 22:32 (4:03) 6:72 2:17 6:32 7:11 9
France 22:82 (4:98) 6:52 3:83 5:82 6:65 127
Germany 20:07 (4:31) 7:19 3:01 3:85 6:02 72
Greece 18:52 ( ) 7:16 1:00 3:99 6:37 1
Ireland 29:93 (1:71) 6:89 8:35 7:08 7:61 4
Italy 20:89 (3:35) 6:19 1:16 5:67 7:88 23
Luxembourg 15:75 (7:40) 5:18 0:67 4:59 5:32 3
Netherlands 20:82 (7:02) 5:59 2:37 5:86 7:01 37
Norway 19:52 (4:23) 7:48 2:71 4:24 5:08 7
Portugal 14:71 (6:20) 4:34 0:67 3:76 5:94 3
Spain 17:13 (3:39) 5:32 0:81 5:04 5:95 26
Sweden 23:91 (5:21) 6:33 5:30 5:41 6:87 32
United Kingdom 29:94 (4:53) 7:35 7:56 7:07 7:96 158
All 23:80 (6:49) 6:68 4:42 5:78 6:92 542
Note: The table presents the mean of the Deminor corporate governance scores by coun-
try for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Board and Disclosure, with the standard
deviation in parentheses. The rightmost column shows the number of observations N .
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Table 3: Corporate governance scores by industry
Shareholder Takeover Board
Year Total rights defences structure Disclosure N
Aerospace 19:95 (3:12) 5:45 0:50 6:50 7:51 6
Apparel 20:79 (5:19) 6:89 4:50 3:85 5:56 2
Automotive 20:94 (5:30) 6:46 3:66 4:61 6:20 45
Beverages 27:29 (5:03) 7:46 5:41 6:79 7:63 18
Chemicals 23:37 (5:87) 6:96 4:51 5:33 6:58 37
Construction 25:47 (4:78) 6:43 5:79 6:21 7:04 30
Diversied 23:16 (5:67) 6:56 4:31 5:57 6:73 36
Drugs, cosmetics and health care 25:38 (7:91) 6:82 5:02 6:31 7:22 21
Electrical 23:76 (3:10) 6:14 4:25 6:09 7:28 8
Electronics 22:92 (5:67) 6:53 4:85 5:19 6:35 21
Food 24:74 (6:81) 6:38 4:85 6:33 7:18 19
Metal producers 30:31 (6:60) 7:05 7:31 7:55 8:40 12
Metal product manufacturers 30:33 (4:42) 7:28 8:15 6:82 8:08 6
Machinery and equipment 23:58 (5:93) 7:06 6:00 4:66 5:86 19
Oil, gas, coal 25:36 (6:24) 6:60 4:33 6:57 7:86 38
Paper 20:90 (1:68) 5:69 2:25 5:93 7:03 4
Printing and publishing 20:32 (8:94) 5:53 3:44 5:00 6:34 11
Recreation 27:45 (5:26) 7:37 6:03 6:52 7:53 9
Retailers 24:05 (7:12) 6:94 4:85 5:81 6:45 35
Tobacco 29:51 (4:52) 7:42 7:21 7:02 7:86 18
Transportation 19:81 (4:05) 6:07 1:19 5:64 6:92 15
Utilities 22:43 (6:95) 6:63 3:32 5:59 6:89 107
Miscellaneous 23:45 (6:60) 6:94 4:04 5:64 6:82 25
All 23:80 (6:49) 6:68 4:42 5:78 6:92 542
Note: The table presents the mean of the Deminor corporate governance scores by industry for Share-
holder rights, Takeover defences, Board and Disclosure, with the standard deviation in parentheses. The
rightmost column shows the number of observations N .
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Table 4: Linear regression model
Expected
Variable Sign [1] [2] [3]
Corporate Governance
Governance total    0:003
(0:007)
Shareholder rights   0:000  0:255
(0:023) (0:092)
Takeover defences + 0:007 0:006
(0:010) (0:009)
Board structure    0:005  0:013
(0:088) (0:090)
Disclosure    0:064  0:300
(0:091) (0:088)
Disclosure  + 0:040
Shareholder rights (0:015)
Issue characteristics
LNSIZE   0:004 0:009 0:012
(0:054) (0:055) (0:056)
LNMATUR + 0:681 0:693 0:687
(0:128) (0:123) (0:123)
CALL + 0:097 0:093 0:074
(0:186) (0:180) (0:182)
CONV    2:446  2:452  2:450
(0:459) (0:460) (0:461)
SUBORD + 0:398 0:393 0:419
(0:355) (0:350) (0:357)
Issuer characteristics
DE + 0:649 0:652 0:642
(0:121) (0:127) (0:126)
MARGIN    0:021  0:020  0:022
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004)
TIMES   0:002 0:001 0:001
(0:005) (0:004) (0:004)
LNASSETS    0:268  0:261  0:263
(0:035) (0:041) (0:044)
STDRETN + 0:410 0:412 0:411
(0:072) (0:072) (0:070)
Market characteristics
BC + 0:277 0:284 0:292
(0:205) (0:190) (0:187)
Adj. R2 0:501 0:500 0:504
No. of obs. 542 542 542
Note: The Table presents estimation results for the linear regression
model in (1) with dierent contents of the vector of governance scores
xi;t. Coecient estimates are obtained with ordinary least squares, with
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at
the country level shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
signicance at the (two-sided) 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Table 5: Testing for threshold eects
Threshold variable
Shareholder Takeover Board
rights defences structure Disclosure
All 0:024 0:794 0:701 0:543
Shareholder rights 0:010 0:737 0:703 0:874
Takeover defences 0:920 0:966 0:838 0:880
Board structure 0:034 0:806 0:609 0:605
Disclosure 0:012 0:707 0:575 0:381
Note: The table presents p-values of the heteroskedasticity-consistent
Wald test of the null hypothesis 1 = 2 in the threshold regression model
(2). The p-values are obtained by means of the xed regressor bootstrap
procedure with 999 bootstrap replications. The dierent columns corre-
spond to dierent choices of the threshold variable qit, while dierent row
correspond to dierent governance measures for which linearity is tested.
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Table 6: Threshold regression model
qi;t  r^ qi;t > r^
Shareholder rights  0:229  0:149
(0:061) (0:049)
Takeover defences 0:018 0:011
(0:020) (0:011)
Board structure 0:120  0:060
(0:064) (0:088)
Disclosure  0:186  0:014
(0:066) (0:097)
r^ 5.952
Adj. R2 0.512
No. of obs. 119 423
Note: The table presents coecent estimates
for the corporate governance scores in the
threshold regression model (2) with Share-
holder rights as the threshold variable qi;t.
Standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-
consistent and clustered at the country level
are shown in parentheses. The nal row
shows the number of observations for which
Shareholder rights is below and above the
threshold estimate r^. *, **, and *** de-
note statistical signicance at the (two-sided)
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Table 7: Robustness checks: The role of credit quality
Expected
Variable Sign [1] [2] [3] [4]
Corporate Governance
Shareholder rights    0:022  0:410  0:151  0:319
(0:187) (0:064) (0:097) (0:296)
Takeover defences +  0:004 0:007  0:011 0:027
(0:011) (0:021) (0:019) (0:013)
Board structure    0:026 0:029 0:020  0:023
(0:128) (0:063) (0:083) (0:113)
Disclosure    0:072  0:479  0:297  0:310
(0:182) (0:109) (0:075) (0:309)
Disclosure  + 0:004 0:067 0:036 0:039
Shareholder rights (0:028) (0:015) (0:019) (0:041)
Adj. R2 0:524 0:495 0:708 0:644
No. of obs. 271 271 271 271
Note: Models [1] and [2] ([3] and [4]) are linear regression models as given in (1)
where yi;t+1 is the SPREAD of a bond issued by rm i in year t + 1, based on
the sub-sample of observations for which for which TIMES (STDRETN) is be-
low and above its median value, corrected for year and UK eects. Coecient
estimates are obtained with ordinary least squares, with standard errors that are
heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at the country level shown in parenthe-
ses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signicance at the (two-sided) 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 level, respectively.
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Table 8: Sensitivity analysis: The role of Maturity
Expected
Variable Sign [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Corporate Governance
Shareholder rights    0:220  0:433  0:975  0:354  0:030
(0:102) (0:141) (0:642) (0:122) (0:115)
Takeover defences + 0:007 0:006 0:008  0:005 0:023
(0:009) (0:009) (0:009) (0:015) (0:015)
Board structure    0:007  0:010  0:010  0:041  0:015
(0:085) (0:089) (0:085) (0:078) (0:071)
Disclosure    0:645  0:290  1:364  0:477 0:005
(0:101) (0:102) (0:697) (0:122) (0:152)
Disclosure  + 0:035 0:039 0:145 0:064 0:000
Shareholder rights (0:016) (0:016) (0:104) (0:021) (0:018)
LNMATUR  + 0:193 0:564
Disclosure (0:087) (0:354)
LNMATUR  + 0:094 0:387
Shareholder rights (0:089) (0:287)
LNMATUR     0:057
Disclosure  (0:052)
Shareholder rights
Adj. R2 0:514 0:505 0:514 0:610 0:412
No. of obs. 542 542 542 271 271
Note: Model [1] is the linear regression model as given in (1), where the additional interaction
term LNMATUR  Shareholder rights included. Model [2] includes the additional interaction
term LNMATUR  Disclosure. Model [3] includes both additional interaction terms andthe
interaction term LNMATUR  Shareholder rights  Disclosure. Model [4] ([5]) is based on the
sub-sample of observations for which LNMATUR is below (above) its median value, corrected
for year and UK eects. Coecient estimates are obtained with ordinary least squares, with
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at the country level shown
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signicance at the (two-sided) 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 level, respectively.
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Table 9: Sensitivity analysis: The role of Board structure
Expected
Variable Sign [1] [2] [3]
Corporate Governance
Shareholder rights    0:252  0:126  0:260
(0:082) (0:039) (0:091)
Takeover defences + 0:005 0:006 0:007
(0:012) (0:009) (0:010)
Board structure    0:169 0:181
(0:130) (0:146)
Board  + 0:024  0:030
Shareholder rights (0:008) (0:022)
Disclosure    0:307  0:051  0:462
(0:077) (0:094) (0:180)
Disclosure  + 0:040 0:065
Shareholder rights (0:014) (0:031)
Adj. R2 0:505 0:501 0:504
No. of obs. 542 542 542
Note: Model [1] is the linear regression model as given in (1), but
with Board structure excluded. Model [2] includes the interaction term
Board structure  Shareholder rights instead of the interaction term
Disclosure  Shareholder rights. Model [3] includes both interaction
terms. Coecient estimates are obtained with ordinary least squares,
with standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clus-
tered at the country level shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical signicance at the (two-sided) 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, re-
spectively.
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